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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
---0000000---
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Jerry Long was charged with the violation of §58-37-8(1); 
(ii), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a felony. The 
information alleged that on or about the 5th day of March, 
1980, he knowingly and intentionally distributed for value 
lysergic acid diethylamide, a schedule I controlled substance 
FACTS AllD DISPOSITION Ill THE LOWER COURT 
At Defendant's first trial on September 18, 1980, he use 
an alibi defense consisting of testimony from friends and 
family that the Defendant was nowhere near the scene of the 
alleged crime as charged by the State. This resulted in a 
hung jury. 
Prior to Defendant's second trial on November 20, 1980, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the same witnesses consisting of Defendant's family and friends 
were again subpoened. All of the witnesses subpoened appeared 
at trial except for two non-family witnesses who were not 
served by the Sheriff's office until 12 hours after the trial 
had concluded. At this second trial, the jury convicted the 
Defendant over his alibi defense. The trial court denied motion 
by defense counsel for a new trial based upon failure of the 
county constable to serve Defendant's witnesses in a timely 
fashion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant requests that his sentence be vacated, and 
that this Court grant him a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COUNTY CONSTABLE'S FAILURE TO SERVE THE WITNESSES 
SUBPOENED BY DEFENDANT DENIED Hrn HIS RIGHT TO COMPEL THE 
ATTENDP.1,TCE OF WITNESSES BY THE PROCESS OF LAW AND PREJUDICED 
HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §77-1-6, as amended, provides 
as follows: "RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT-(1) in criminal prosecutions 
the Defendant is entitled: ... (e) to have compulsory process 
to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. . . " and 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, §77-35-14, as amended, provides in part: 
SUBPOENA (a) . . . the clerk of the court 
in which a case is pending shall issue and 
blank to the Defendant, without charge, as 
many signed subpoenas as the Defendant may 
require. (b) A subpoena may corrnnand a per-
son to whom it is directed to appear and 
testify or to produce in court or to allow 
inspection of records, papers or other Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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objects. The court may quash or modify the 
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable. 
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person 
over.the age of 18 years who is not a party. 
Service shall be made by delivering a copy of 
the subpoena to the witness or interpreter 
personally and notifying him of the contents. 
A eace officer shall serve any subpoena delivered 
to im or service in is county. emp asis 
added). 
It seems clear that the Defendant in a criminal prosecu· 
tion has a right to have the compulsory processes and powers 
of the state to insure the attendance of witnesses in his 
behalf at trial. And Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure places a mandatory duty upon peace officers to serv-
any subpoena delivered to them for service in the county. 
Subparagraph (d) of Rule 14 also provides that "·written retur: 
of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the court 
and to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, 
stating the time and place of service and by whom service was 
made" (emphasis added). That is a peace officer, as an offic: 
of the state, has an affirmative duty to serve any subpoenas 
delivered to him in a timely and a prompt manner, and deliver 
a return of service in a like manner. In State v Sandoval, 
590 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979), this court said: 
Any Defendant in a criminal case has a right 
to call any witness• who can offer testimony 
in his favor. No witness has a right to with-
hold testimony unless the testimony would tend 
to incriminate himself. 590 P.2d at 347. 
Before Defendant's second trial, he delivered subpoenas 
to the Utah County Constable for the same 6 persons, consisti 
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of family and friends, as had testified at his first trial. 
However on November 20, 1980, at Defendant's second trial, 
only witnesses who were related to the Defendant had received 
subpoenas and actually testified at trial. The two witnesses 
at the prior trial who were not related to the Defendant were 
not served by the Utah County Constable until 12 hours after 
the end of the trial. No evidence was ever offered that the 
constables had made a diligent search or effort to serve these 
two potential witnesses with said subpoenas. The trial court 
was unperterbed at these witnesses absence in the second 
trial, and held that their testimony was merely cumilative 
in the case of the second trial, and their absence was not 
prejudicial to the Defendant's interest. The obvious flaw 
in such an approach is a fact that Defendant was convicted 
the second time in the absence of testimony by non-relatives, 
where in the first trial with the testimony of witnesses not 
related to the Defendant, no conviction was reached. Although 
all the witnesses testified to the same thing, that is that 
the Defendant was at a different location at the time of the 
alleged crime than the location alleged by the state, and in 
that sense the testimony was cumilative, there is a clear 
difference in the weight given to testimony by witnesses who 
were relatives with the Defendant and those who were not. The 
jurors in such a case are obviously much more likely to give 
little credence to testimony from related and interested per-
sons, than to testimony by persons unrelated to the Defendant. 
The very fact that in the second trial the Defendant was Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum nd Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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convicted without the testimony in his behalf of witnesses 
who were not related to him attest to the fact that their 
absence was extremely prejudicial to him. 
Because the absence of Defendant's witnesses was direct: 
attributable to a failure by the Utah County Constable to 
abide by its statutory duty to serve subpoenas of the 
Defendant in a timely and prompt fashion aggrevates the 
denial to the Defendant of his rights to the state's compul· 
sory processes. At the very least an effort should have 
been made at trial to ascertain whether or not the county 
constable had made a good faith effort to serve the witness~ 
but was unable to until after the trial. However no such in· 
formation appears in the record. Therefore the Appellan 
right to the compulsory processes of the law to procure 
witnesses to testify in his behalf at trial was violated by 
the constable's failure to serve the potential witnesses unti 
after the trial, and Defendant's conviction at this second 
trial should be vacated. 
II. THE EVIDENCE OBTALt1ED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WAS OBTAINED 
BY A PEACE OFFICER OUTSIDE HIS JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES AND 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
As a general rule, in the absence of statutory or consti· 
tutional authority a peace officer has no official power to 
arrest beyond the territorial boundary of the state, city, m 
county for which he is elected or appointed. Irwin v State 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 517 P.2d 619 (Wash. 1974); ~ 
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v Hodgson , 200 A.2d 567 (Del. Sup. 1964); State v Williams, 
347 A.2d 333 (NJ. 1975); Boswell v State, 19 So.2d 94 (Ala. 
1944). 
There is no common law authority for a police officer to 
act beyond city boundaries. Martin v Houck, 54 S.Ct. 291 
(1906); 5 Am.Jur., arrest, §50. Consequently, unless the 
state of conduct was authorized by statute, the conduct is 
illegal. 
§77-9-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, has auth-
orized a peace officer's authority beyond the limits of his 
normal jurisdiction in certain limited circumstances: 
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any 
governmental agency of this state may exercise 
a peace officer's authority beyond the limits 
of such officer's normal jurisdiction as follows: 
(a) When in fast pursuit on an offender for the 
purpose of arresting and holding that person in 
custody or returning the suspect to the juris-
diction where the offense was comr.iitted; (b) 
when a public offense is cormnitted in such officers 
presence; (c) when participating in an investigation 
of criminal activity which originated in such 
officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with 
the local authorities; (d) when called to assist 
peace officers of another jurisdiction. 
(2) Any peace officer prior to taking such auth-
orized action, shall notify and receive approval 
of the local law enforcement authority, or at 
such prior contact is not reasonably possible 
notify the local law enforcement authority as 
soon as reasonably possible. Unless specifically 
requested to aid a police officer of another 
jurisdiction or otherwise provided for by law, 
no legal responsibility for a police officers 
actions outside his normal jurisdiction as 
provided herein, shall attach to the local law 
enforcement authority. 
A peace officer may then exercise his authority when 
outside the limits of his normal jurisdiction when he is in Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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fresh pursuit, re turning a suspect to the jurisdiction where 
the offense was committed, where an offense is committed in 
the officer's presence, in investigations which being in one 
jurisdiction but enter another (in cooperation with the loca: 
authorities), and when expressly requested to by officers of 
another jurisdiction. In the instant case, Officer Winn 
testified that they left the city of Pleasant Grove and 
arrived in the city of Orem where an alleged sale of drugs 
was made. Officer Winn was clearly not in fresh pursuit and 
was not returning any suspect to a jurisdiction where an 
offense was committed. He was not participating in an invest 
igation which began in his jurisdiction and entered another 
jurisdiction ~cooperation with the local authority, nor hac 
he been expressly requested to assist the officers within th< 
Orem City jurisdiction. In fact, no one in the Orem City Pol 
Department even knew Officer Winn was active in their city. 
The only possiblity under which Officer Winn may have been 
properly authorized to act as a peace officer is when and if 
a "public offense" was committed in his presence. However 
were the public offenses not cormnitted within the jurisdicti 
of Officer Winn, he would not be exercising his duties as a 
peace officer per se. Instead he would be acting under the 
authority granted to any other ordinary citizen who observes 
the commission of a public offense. Utah Code Annotated, 19: 
§77-7-3, as amended, sets forth the requirements for a valid 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 







BY PRIVATE PERSOllS-a private person may 
arrest another: (1) for a public offense 
colllf!litted or attempted in his presence; or 
(2) when a felony has been committed and he 
has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person arrested has committed it. 
That is when Officer Winn left his jurisdictional terri-
tory, in Pleasant Grove, and arrived in Orem City, State of 
Utah, in order to exercise his peace officer's authority, he 
had to come within the above-listed requirements of hot pursuit, 
permission, etc. But the only paragraph of §77-9-3 which would 
validate his actions is sub-paragraph (1) (b): "when a public 
offense is committed in such officer's presence". And the only 
authority which he could be exercising there would be the same 
which a private person could exercise under the same circum-
stances. This principle has been solidly established in Utah 
law since the case of People v Coughlin, 44 P.94 (Utah 1896). 
In that case the Supreme Court upheld the Defendant's conviction 
for murder despite the fact that he was arrested by Sheriffs 
outside the county of their jurisdiction, and after they had 
pursued him across several different counties. The court con-
sidered the predecesors statute to §77-7-3 which provided as 
follows: 
A private person may arrest another: (1) for a 
public offense committed or attempted in his 
presence. (2) When a person ~rre~ted has com-
mitted a felony although not in his presence. 
(3) When a felony has been in fact committed, 
and he has reasonable cause for believing the 
person arrested to have committed it. Compiled 
Laws of Utah §4855. 
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The Coughlin court reasoned that because there was no 
doubt that a felony had in fact been cornrnitted and the office 
had a reasonable cause for believing the persons they were 
attempting to arrest had committed it, the arresting officers, 
"though acting as private persons, had the right, under the 
circumstances to arrest [the defendants]". 44 P. at 95. 
In the case at bar, if Officer Winn was acting under any 
authority at all while in the City of Orem, he was acting as 
an ordinary citizen was entitled to act under Utah Code Annot. 
§77-7-3. The question then becomes whether or not the Defenc 
committed or attempted to commit a public offense in his pres 
The State of California considered a factual situation 
virtually identical to the case at bar in People v Aldapa, 
17 Cal.App. 3d. 184, 94 Cal.Rptr. 579 (1979). The Appellant 
court in that case reversed the Defendant's conviction of 
possession of heroin for sale because the arrest by a city 
police officer outside the city police jurisdiction was not 
authorized by the statute governing the power to make arresu 
outside city limits. Evidence in that case established that 
several informants had contacted city police officers of Los 
Angeles to the effect that the Defendant was selling narcotic 
at a location outside the city, but within the County of Los 
Angeles. The officer's conducted surveilances of the premis< 
observed circumstances they deemed suspicious, and rushed the 
residence of the Defendants, arresting the occupants. At t~ 
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time of these arrests California Penal Code, §817, as 
aoended, provided in its pertinent part: 
The authority of a peace officer extends to 
any place in the state (a) as to a public 
offense committed or which there is probable 
cause to believe has been committed within 
the political subdivision that employs him 
or (b) if he has the prior consent of the 
chief of police or person authorized by him 
to give such consent if the place is within 
a ciy or the sheriff or person authorized 
by him to give such consent of the place is 
within a county . . . 
The record at trial showed no proof of prior authoriza-
tion and a lack of probable cause. The court then stated: 
Since the officers did not fall within the 
provisions of §817, their power to arrest 
when acting beyond the limits of the geo-
graphic area under their authority would 
be that conferred upon a private citizen 
in the same circumstances. (citations 
omitted) The authority for a private 
citizen to make an arrest is provided by 
Penal Code, §837: ''A private person may 
arrest another: (1) for a public offense 
committed or attempted in his presence. 
(2) When the person arrested has cOllllllitted 
a felony, although not in his presence. 
(3) When a felony has in fact been committed, 
and he has reasonable cause for believing 
the person arrested to have colIIIIlitted it." 
94 Cal. Rptr. at 581. 
The court decided that the officers only hope at quali-
fying under the statutory provisions was under paragraph 
3 of Penal Code, §837. Further: 
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Considering the third provision of the statute 
the question becomes one of its interpretation'. 
For there to be a valid arrest by a private cit-
izen under Penal Code, §837 (3) the requirement 
that th:re in fa~t be_a felony committed can only 
be met if there is evidence of the corpus delicti 
and it is an offense known by the arresting party 
to have been corrnnitted. (Citations omitted) A 
private citizen unlike a peace officer may not 
arrest whenever he has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person to be arrested has committed a 
public offense in his presence, or whenever he has 
reasonable cause to believe that such person has 
committed a felony, whether or not a felony has 
in fact been committed. The corpus delicti for 
possession of narcotics for sale is (1) possession 
and (2) possession for purposes of sale. (citation 
orrnnitted). At the trial, the only evidence offerec 
to show possession of heroin was the heroin found 
after Defendant was arrested. Id. at 582. 
Under the circumstances of the Aldapa case or as the cas 
at bar, the only evidence which was offered to show the know! 
by the officer of a prior offense having been committed was 
that evidence seized when the officer was outside his jurisd'.. 
tion, acting as a private citizen. And by conducting the pur 
of an allegedly illegal drug as a private citizen, Officer~ 
was clearly exceeding his authority, and his action was ille1 
Although the State of Utah used to hold that the fruits 
an illegal search or evidence obtained illegally were admiss1 
at trial (State v Fair, 353 P.2d 615 (Utah 1960)) the United 
States Supreme Court has since that time established the exc: 
sionary rule which countermands the use of evidence obtained 
illegally. Wong Sun v United States, 371 U.S. 471 83 S.Ct. 
407, (1963). But that same court has held that mere irregui: 
in the manner in which a Defendant may be brought into custc: 
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of law are not grounds for holding that he should not be 
tried for the crime with which he is charged. Ker v Illinois, 
119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225 (1886). And most recently in United 
States v Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, (1980), the court 
stated: 
Insofar as [defendant) challenges his own 
presence at trial, he cannot claim irrrrnunity 
from prosecution siQply because his appearance 
in court was percepi.tated by an unlawful arrest. 
An illegal arrest, without more, has never been 
viewed as a bar to a subsequent prosecution, nor 
as a defense to a valid conviction. 445 U.S. at 474. 
The position of the United States Supreme Court is that 
where evidence is obtained illegally it may not be presented for 
consideration of the jury at trial, although the Defendant may 
still be tried on the charges to which that evidence pertained. 
In City of Pasco v Titus, 613 P.2d 181 (Wash. App. 1980), 
the Washington Court of Appeals reversed a decision by the trial 
clerk to dismiss charges against the Defendant on the grounds 
that he had been illegally arrested. The Court held that 
dismissal of the charges not required merely because of the 
illegal arrest, and the trial court, instead of dismissing the 
case, should have merely ruled that the city could not intro-
duce the evidence it obtained by its illegal actions to prove 
the charges against the Defendant. 
In Washington v Renous, 299 P.2d 620 (Utah 1956), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where the Defendants illegally returned 
to the state and incarcerated, and the Defendants may have poten-
tial civil and/or criminal actions against the wrongdoers, the 
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state still had the power to try the accused of the crimes 
with which they were charged. Likewise in State v Beak, 
584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978), the court held that: 
The "probable cause" required for a warrent 
of arrest, if lacking, may prevent the intro-
duction of unlawfully seized evidence at the 
trial, but it does not prevent the trial and 
conviction of the Defendant. 584 P.2d at 872. 
The evidence used to convict the Defendant at trial ~s 
obtained by the explotation of information illegally obtaine: 
by officers of the state while outside their jurisdiction. 
Although the exclusionary rule mandates that such evidence 
not be admissable at trial, the state may nevertheless still 
bring charges against the Defendant without the use of such 
evidence. However because the evidence was directly involve: 
in the trial below, where Defendant was convicted, this cour: 
should vacate the conviction of Defendant and order a new tr: 
to be held without the admissability of the aforesaid eviden1 
CONCLUSION 
This case allows the Court to rule on the question of'•' 
or not the Defendant's right to the compulsory process of thi 
in assuring the attendance of his witnesses at trial include' 
showing by this state that any failure to serve subpoenas an'. 
to secure the attendance of witnesses for the Defendant on t< 
of the police was not as a result of their failure to exerci' 
diligence. In this case at the second trial some of the 
subpoenas were served, and some of them were not. Because 
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the most credible witnesses (at least to the jury) were not 
subpoened and not present at Defendant's second trial, he was 
convicted. The Court likewise has an opportunity to rule on 
the question of whether or not the narcotics officer's actions 
outside their assigned jurisdiction comes within that narrow 
range of circumstances innumerated under §77-9-3. Certainly 
until now such officers have had the almost unlimited discre-
tion to go wherever they desire as long as they could roughly 
equate their activity to being connected with a "public offense", 
no matter where it was actually conunitted. For the above 
reasons, counsel for the Defendant respectfully requests that 
the Court vacate the judgment of guilty against Defendant 
rendered by the trial court below, and remand the case for 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of April, 1981. 
Phi hp G. Jones 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, to the Utah Attorney General, 
David Hilkinson, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this day of April, 1981. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
